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Abstract
Cities and their citizens are increasingly seen as vulnerable targets for terrorist 
attacks, and nowadays city planners have become important actors in making deci-
sions about urban security. Multiple urban counterterrorism measures that have 
affected the urban landscape have been implemented in recent years. Simultane-
ously, new legislation requires security measures to be effective. This article outlines 
and discusses the epistemological and ontological challenges of acquiring knowl-
edge about the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures from a local city 
planner’s perspective. This piece of work is a discussion paper based on a literature 
review. We conclude that, despite the knowledge limitations regarding the threat of 
urban terrorism and associated countermeasures, local planners should refrain from 
just uncritically implementing urban countermeasures without considering the effec-
tiveness of such measures. Without knowledge on what constitutes the effectiveness 
of urban security measures, the city might end up infringing the same values that it 
aims to protect, without achieving security.
Keywords Effectiveness · Urban counterterrorism measures · Security
Introduction
Cities and their citizens are increasingly seen as suitable targets for terrorist attacks. 
In recent years, European cities have been the scene of an increase in terrorist 
attacks, predominately against civilians, using low-tech weapons such as knives, 
hand-held firearms, vehicles, or vehicle-borne explosives (Hemmingby 2017). 
Terrorist targets are no longer exclusively limited to the high profile, such as gov-
ernment buildings. Softer targets, such as crowded urban spaces, are also alleged 
to need protection. As a result, key security challenges in this new era focus on 
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everyday sites, public spaces, and gatherings of people (Graham 2012), making 
urban counterterrorism more complex and challenging than before.
Additionally, the requirements for what should substitute the basis of counter-
terrorism decisions have changed. Since 11 September 2001, counterterrorism has 
increasingly been viewed through the lens of the risk management culture that domi-
nates contemporary society (Power 2004; Office, U. S. G. A. 2005), and risk analysis 
has been proposed as the recommended perspective for making decisions about the 
implementation of counterterrorism. This tendency to utilize risk-based approaches 
is mirrored in multiple laws and guidelines published in recent years. The common-
ality of such approaches is that they view terrorism as a manageable risk and deem 
it possible to acquire knowledge about the likelihood and the consequences of an 
attack, as well as to assess the risk-reducing effects of counterterrorism measures 
(Jore 2017). In Norway, the corollary of risk-based thinking is mirrored in a new 
National Security Law, in effect from 1 January 2019. The prerequisite behind this 
new law is that security measures should be based on the principle of economic 
profitability (National Security Law 2018) and that “Costs incurred by the statutory 
security measures must be in reasonable proportion to the security gains achieved 
by the measure” (NOU 2016, p. 18). The implication of this new law is that local 
authorities are now required not only to make cost estimates of security measures 
but also to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures before implemen-
tation. The request to measure effectiveness also exists in multiple other guidelines 
that have been published in recent years (see for example NSM 2015). This article 
questions whether it is possible, from a local perspective, to assess the effectiveness 
of urban counterterrorism measures. Although the mitigation of terrorism through 
situational crime prevention is widespread in many countries (Clarke 2009; Coaffee 
2010), the effectiveness of such measures is hardly ever discussed. This is also the 
case for counterterrorism in general; in their meta-analysis of the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism measures, Lum et al. (2006) discovered that out of 20,000 evalu-
ated studies on terrorism, only seven contained information on the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism policies. They concluded that we currently know almost nothing 
about the effectiveness of any of these programs (Lum et al. 2006, p. 510). Moreo-
ver, studies that deal with the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures tend to 
analyse the effectiveness from a state or sector perspective, predominantly using 
quantitative data analysis to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures 
(see for example Cauley and Im 1988; Enders and Sandier 1993). In their literature 
review of the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, Van Um and Pisoiu (2015) 
found that the literature displays case and data selection biases and has produced 
contradictory results with regard to the effectiveness of measures. Scholars have also 
dealt with how to measure the cost of counterterrorism measures (see for example 
Akhtar et  al. 2010; Stewart 2008; Stewart and Mueller 2013; Dillon et  al. 2009), 
but in general these scholars do not problematize the concept of effectiveness. Con-
sequently, the academic literature does not seem to answer the simple question: Is 
it really possible to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures from a 
local planner’s perspective?
The threat of terrorism that can strike at an almost endless number of locations 
entails major challenges for the various local agencies that are responsible for 
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protecting people, assets and critical infrastructure from such threats. Thus, there is 
reason to ask whether it is really possible to measure the effectiveness of counterter-
rorism measures from a local perspective or whether there are certain characteristics 
of the threat of terrorism that make the prism of effectiveness a problematic one 
to apply. There might be inherent characteristics within the threat of terrorism and 
associated security measures that place limitations on the possibility of measuring 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism. The objective of this article is to outline and 
discuss the epistemological and ontological challenges involved in acquiring knowl-
edge about the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures. When dealing with 
the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures, it is appropriate to ask: What 
is the phenomenon the city strives to protect itself from, and how do the character-
istics of the phenomenon influence our ability to measure the effectiveness of urban 
counterterrorism measures? This piece of work is a discussion paper based on a lit-
erature review. We use urban counterterrorism in Norway as an example to illustrate 
these challenges. We conclude that the ontological and epistemological challenges 
of evaluating the effectiveness of security measures do not mean that the measure-
ment of the effectiveness of urban security measures is impossible. The ontological 
and epistemological challenges should rather be seen as knowledge constraints that 
need to be taken into account when considering the effectiveness of urban counter-
terrorism measures. The overall aim of this article is to contribute to building better 
security practices, in addition to contributing methodological reflections in security 
research.
Methodological approach
Bearing in mind the vast quantity of resources spent on urban terrorism security 
during recent decades, the academic literature that deals with the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism measures is surprisingly small. Thus, the topic is under-researched, 
compared to its wide application. In order to investigate how to measure the effec-
tiveness of counterterrorism measures from a local perspective, we performed a lit-
erature search, looking for articles that dealt with the effectiveness of urban coun-
terterrorism measures. We used search engines such as Google Scholar and Web of 
Science to find relevant academic articles. We applied the search words, “effective-
ness”, “effect”, “counterterrorism”, “terrorism”, to look for articles that dealt with 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism in general and for city planners in particular. 
Since our search generated a large number of academic articles, we manually went 
through the articles to select the most relevant ones. While there were a number of 
articles that dealt with the topic of urban counterterrorism, few dealt with the matter 
of effectiveness. Consequently, we also included in the sample academic articles that 
dealt with the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures in general. Furthermore, 
we also included literature dealing with the effectiveness of risk-reducing measures. 
In total, 71 articles were selected for analysis. Although this work builds on these 
academic articles, its aim is not to give a general state of the art of the literature on 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. This has already been done by other 
scholars (see for example Lum et al. 2006; Van Um and Pisoiu 2015). Our aim was 
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rather to build on the literature, to outline whether the prism of effectiveness is a 
suitable perspective from a local planner’s point of view and to outline characteris-
tics of the phenomenon of terrorism that need to be taken into account when meas-
uring the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures. We have chosen to use 
Norway as the general example in this article, since Norway recently implemented 
a security law (The National Security Law 2018) that requires effectiveness as the 
basis of the implementation of counterterrorism measures.
When dealing with the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures, it is 
appropriate to ask: What is the phenomenon the city strives to protect itself from, 
and how do the characteristics of the phenomenon influence our ability to measure 
the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures? To answer these questions, 
we analysed the literature, by classifying the characteristics that challenge the evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of counterterrorism into two main categories, dependent 
on the status of knowledge:
(1) Ontological characteristics concern what terrorism and urban counterterrorism 
is and its nature (Solberg and Njå 2012). Thus, ontological challenges deal with 
what is inherent in the empirical phenomenon of terrorism and urban counter-
terrorism that influences what we can know about the phenomenon. Ontology 
refers to the phenomena of reality as such, which we might or might not know, 
thus having phenomenological or factual knowledge or not (Daase and Kessler 
2007).
(2) Epistemological characteristics describe the nature of knowledge regarding 
terrorism and urban counterterrorism measures and how knowledge might be 
acquired. Subsequently, epistemological challenges concern how knowledge 
about terrorism and the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism can or cannot be 
achieved and the limitations that hamper our attempts to obtain such knowledge 
(Daase and Kessler 2007; Solberg and Njå 2012).
Ontological and epistemological issues are closely interrelated; the nature of 
terrorism threats and countermeasures influences how knowledge can be acquired 
regarding these phenomena (Jackson et  al. 2009; Jore 2012). The ontological and 
epistemological challenges regarding measuring the effectiveness of urban counter-
terrorism measures are summarized in Table 1.
Terrorism and counterterrorism are discursive phenomena
Military technology and strategy have always played a key role in the urbanization 
process. Ruling powers have sought to defend their interests by protecting citizens 
from threats, to ensure loyalty and enhance the feeling of collectiveness, by making 
a mark on the landscape of cities. What is new in the accentuating trends in security 
since 11 September 2001 is that security has become descaled, de-territorial and 
local (Coaffee 2005). Contemporary terrorism is seen as a transnational phenom-
enon, in which non-state actors seek to cause political change at the national and 
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international levels, by creating a state of fear through illegitimate means. Despite 
the often international political agendas of terrorism, the current threat of terror-
ism is perceived to be internal rather than external. This is exemplified by the mani-
fold attacks stemming from home-grown terrorism against multiple European cities 
in recent years. Thus, security has become a joint responsibility, in which multi-
ple actors, such as the municipality and local police, have a shared obligation. This 
downscaling of security responsibility has given local actors, such as city planners 
and municipalities, a critical role in counterterrorism.
Urban counterterrorism measures are a result of terrorism being perceived as a 
ubiquitous, omnipresent societal threat and of counterterrorism being seen through 
the lens of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary societies 
(Ericson 2006; Power 2004). Consequently, as a threat to cities and their citizens, 
terrorism is a result of a specific discourse on threats and how such threats should 
be prevented. Just to be clear: this does not mean that terrorism is not a real-world 
phenomenon causing devastation, suffering and damage to cities worldwide. It most 
certainly is. However, it is our understanding of terrorist attacks and the associated 
threats that is the discursive element in the phenomenon of terrorism, because the 
concept of terrorism is not a neutral word pointing to an objective, independent and 
neutral ontological phenomenon. The definition of terrorism is contested, its origins 
are disputed, and counterterrorism measures are highly ambiguous (Fischbacher-
Smith 2016). Thus, the meaning put into the term and how this phenomenon should 
be managed is the result of discursive meaning making. The discursive element of 
terrorism is influenced not only by the way the city is perceived to be threatened but 
also by what countermeasures are considered legitimate to implement. Through the 
portrayal of terrorism as a threat that is targeting civilians, no one can feel safe from 
terrorism, and the city has become a vulnerable object under constant threat, where 
no one can feel safe. This is what is often referred to as exceptionalism: by creating 
a state of crisis and emergency, extraordinary measures have become ordinary and a 
Table 1  Ontological and epistemological challenges regarding measuring the effectiveness of urban 
counterterrorism measures
Ontological challenges Epistemological challenges
Terrorism and counterterrorism 
are discursive phenomena
The phenomena are imbued with ambiguities regarding what are 
perceived as effective ways to counter the threat
Transboundary wicked problem Hard to establish causality and control for third variables
Security is a non-event Difficult to prove a negative
Low probability Lack of data and hard to establish causality
Data not representable, transferable or suitable for generalizations
Secrecy Unpredictability, lack of valid data on countermeasures
Rational actors Substitution effects
Malicious intent Hard to prove malicious intent, false positive
Human complexity Multi-causal and multi-agency, little knowledge on the rationality of 
target selection
Ultimate goal is political change Negative side effects, fear-inducing measures, symbolic values, value 
discrepancies
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part of everyday city life (Aradau and Van Munster 2009). The ultimate consequence 
of this is that city planners and other actors are forced to take precautionary actions 
against terrorism, in the endeavour to create a more secure society. Subsequently, 
urban counterterrorism measures are often precaution-based rather than risk- or evi-
dence-based. The discursive element of terrorism and counterterrorism entails that 
ambiguities that influence the quality of data and what are considered effective and 
legitimate ways to counter the threat are embedded in the knowledge concerning 
these phenomena. The discursive element of terrorism entails a challenge to measur-
ing the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism, because the discursive element of 
terrorism and counterterrorism implies that urban counterterrorism might be a result 
of the current discourse threatening the actual way of reducing the threat.
The transboundary wicked problem of terrorism
It is not only the discursive aspect of terrorism that poses a challenge to knowl-
edge on the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. A city planner facing the 
dilemma of how and where to implement security interventions also faces a specific 
type of policy problem, often referred to as a transboundary wicked problem. Ter-
rorism is not only hard to define and dependent on political–historical discourses, 
moreover, its origins and solutions are unclear and ambiguous, connected with 
value discrepancies. Terrorism is intractable, in terms of contested knowledge and 
expertise, contested values and unpredictability, in terms of religious and ideologi-
cal dimensions and territorial and geopolitical struggles. Additionally, terrorism 
is intertwined with other wicked issues (such as the refugee crisis and organized 
crime) and is characterized by disruptive potential, political and public attention, 
the performative effects of communication, and global organizational and financial 
infrastructure (Noordegraaf et al. 2017). Consequently, for a municipality facing the 
dilemma of whether to implement a security measure, terrorism represents a form of 
a transboundary wicked problem that is not only about a local challenge, interwoven 
with uncertainty, but also about globally connected events and ambiguity. Terror-
ists often direct their violence and threats at a large target group, not immediately 
involved in the political decision-making process that they intend to influence. The 
larger the target group, the more difficult it is for authorities to anticipate the next 
attack (Enders and Sandler 1993). What makes terrorism such a wicked problem is 
the diversity that is present within the various attack scenarios that could material-
ize and the associated uncertainty of the intensity of attacks, in which terrorists with 
relatively simple weapons can cause devastation with cascading effects and major 
political impacts. The potential range of targets that could be attacked and the poten-
tial force multipliers that can be found within the urban spaces that could become 
the scene of an attack are almost unimaginable (Fischbacher-Smith 2016). The 
diversified threats that could stem from internal or external perpetrators, from single 
individuals to state sponsored groups, in addition to the broad spectrum of possible 
preventive efforts, make urban security governance demanding and difficult.
The transboundary wicked dimensions of terrorism entail that to give a simple 
answer to the question of which urban security measures work—against which 
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threats under which circumstances—might not be easy, because establishing cau-
sality between intervention and impact is a major challenge for transboundary 
wicked problems. To establish causality in social sciences, four criteria should be 
met (David and Sutton 2011). First, covariation should be established, to provide 
evidence that policy intervention systematically varies with values on the dependent 
variable. Secondly, it should be verified that it was the intervention that produced 
that observed change, by establishing the time order. Thirdly, attempts should be 
made to exclude other possible causes of the observed impact. As a final point, it 
should be possible to give a plausible theoretical explanation of the policy impact.
Transboundary wicked problems involve major challenges for the evaluation of 
urban countermeasures’ effectiveness, since it is hard to prove causality. Such risk 
problems cross the boundaries between countries, policy domains, organizations and 
scientific disciplines. To assess the effectiveness of countermeasures, a researcher 
must study large networks and numerous interventions on multiple scales, in order 
to trace the chains of cause and effect. Consequently, in the case of urban terrorism, 
effectiveness cannot strictly be evaluated, as the phenomenon, its actors and arenas, 
potential measures and implications are highly ambiguous and fundamentally con-
tested (Noordegraaf et al. 2017). There are many possible causes for increases in the 
number of terrorist attacks in a certain city, as there are many possible reasons why 
a city can be the target of a terrorist attack. A decrease in terrorism threats against a 
city might not be influenced by measures at the city level at all. An alteration in the 
number of terrorist attacks in one area might also be triggered by political factors in 
other countries (e.g. that the Islamic State is losing territory in Syria) or the imple-
mentation of other interventions (such as measures to prevent the funding of terror-
ism). Consequently, the transboundary wicked nature of terrorism makes it hard to 
establish causality and control for third variables.
It is generally agreed that transboundary wicked problems must be fought with 
various measures on several different scales. As the public administrator, the main 
planning authority and the owner of land and buildings, the city authorities (or the 
municipality) have an important cross-sector coordination role in governing urban 
terrorism security. However, few municipalities in Norway have the competence and 
capacity to manage the threat of terrorism, given that this is a totally new type of 
threat to Norwegian society and, thus, also new to the municipality and its local 
co-actors.
Security is a non‑event
The aim of implementing local counterterrorism measures is to achieve security. 
However, to measure what causes security might be methodologically impossi-
ble, since security can be described as a non-event; security is achieved when no 
threats materialize. This makes it hard to study security, because, in practical reality, 
it is only possible to study insecurity—when a threat materializes—and not secu-
rity. This influences the ability to study the effectiveness of urban security, because 
making statements about the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures 
will, in most instances, involve the methodological challenge of proving a negative 
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(Lindekilde 2012): if preventive counterterrorism measures in a city are effective, 
nothing happens, the city is safe and secure and not the scene of a terrorist attack.
To prove, a negative is challenging in two different ways. First, it is impossible 
to empirically prove that a reduced or non-existent terrorist threat is caused by the 
implemented urban measures or that a terrorist threat never existed against the city 
in the first place. Secondly, if nothing happens, it is hard to prove that this is the 
result of the implemented measures and not due to some other form of third vari-
able. Thus, in order to establish causality between intervention and effect, third vari-
ables should be controlled for. In reality, this is not possible when the topic is coun-
terterrorism, as the potential influential variables affecting city safety and security 
are many and interlinked.
Terrorism is a low‑probability event
According to the Norwegian National Security Law (2018), there should be propor-
tionality between security gains and cost-efficiency. Hence, there should be propor-
tionality between the likelihood, cost and security gains. When assessing the effec-
tiveness of security measures through the lens of cost-efficiency, there is a need to 
assess the probabilities of the occurrence of different urban attack scenarios. Often, 
when assessing probabilities, historical statistics data are utilized. Statistical data 
have the advantage that increases and decreases in trends of terrorism can be estab-
lished. In theory, the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures could be investi-
gated by comparing statistics for implemented security measures with statistical 
trends in the number of terrorist attacks, the number of fatalities and material dam-
age (Van Dongen 2011). Statistical data may provide valuable information on gen-
eral and regional trends in the threat landscape. However, it is not possible to carry 
out this quantitative statistical comparison in practice at a city level because urban 
terrorism is an extremely low-probability event. Even if statistics exist for global and 
regional trends in terrorism, it will not, in most instances, be meaningful to utilize 
these statistics on a city scale. The frequency of terrorism in European cities is so 
low that, if trends in terrorism were broken down to a city level, the numbers would 
be so small that it would not be possible to make any valid or reliable claims. To 
assess the probability of an attack against a Norwegian city will, in most instances, 
be to assess the probability of an event that has never happened before.
Since statistical data will never be able to provide valuable information about the 
probability of terrorism at a city level, it is problematic for municipalities in Norway 
to assess terrorism within the frame of cost-efficiently suggested in the new National 
Security Law (2018). In most cases, the probability of a terrorist strike is extremely 
low, meaning that investments in security measures will not pay off in most cases 
(Akhtar et al. 2010). The low frequency of urban terrorist attacks makes it hard to 
utilize the language of effectiveness, if effectiveness is understood as proportionality 
with the likelihood of the threat.
It is hard to demonstrate that urban countermeasures are effective, when the 
probability of such events is extremely low. However, contemporary urban secu-
rity governance is not understood within the frame of proportionally. Rather, it is 
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the discourse of resilience that dominates urban security. Contemporary cities are 
considered to be more vulnerable than before, with a range of possible targets and 
attack scenarios. Furthermore, it is not evident that any threat or warning sign will 
be evident beforehand. As a consequence, resilience has become an important part 
of contemporary urban security discourses. Resilience policy is increasingly driven 
by security concerns and, at the same time, security policy adopts the language of 
resilience (Coaffee and Fussey 2015). The resilience discourse has thus paved the 
way for precaution-based urban security, rather than probability- or evidence-based 
urban security.
Secrecy
The secret nature of terrorism is grounded in the fact that terrorism is a criminal-
ized activity. For a terrorist plot to be effective, the terrorists must keep a low profile 
and not reveal their plans. Thus, terrorism threats are secret by nature. This causes 
challenges to the municipalities that have to decide where to implement measures, 
without having any concrete knowledge on what kind of attack scenario to protect 
against. National threat assessments exist, but threat assessments published by the 
Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) are of a general character, not mentioning 
specific targets, cities or geographical areas. The result is that the Norwegian author-
ities have recommended that security measures should be based on value assess-
ments: it is recommended that security measures are directed at targets that have a 
national security value. However, the trend to attack softer targets and public places 
causes a challenge for cities in their security governance, since this type of threat is 
not necessarily connected with the same objects that have traditionally been seen as 
important to protect, from a national security perspective.
The secret nature of terrorism also influences access to data on the effective-
ness of urban security measures. Since terrorists are strategic human beings that 
can bypass urban security measures, information on implemented measures is 
most often classified information. Consequently, openly accessible overviews and 
information concerning implemented security measures do not exist. The classified 
nature of counterterrorism measures makes it unrealistic to assume that such statis-
tics will ever be made available. The secret nature of security measures also makes 
it hard to share knowledge on what works and what does not work in different situa-
tions. Even if such statistics existed, it would be hard to prove effectiveness by utiliz-
ing statistical data, because of the low likelihood of a terrorist attack.
Rational actors
One of the main challenges in urban security governance is the dynamic risk picture, 
in which a perpetrator is adaptable and may alter targets and tactics according to the 
enactment of urban security measures. The rational, calculating aspects of terrorism 
create a state of fear in the public. Terrorists play on randomness, to keep whole 
populations in fear, anticipation and disestablishment. They precipitate an urge in 
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the population for more certainty, expressed through escalating security measures, 
as witnessed in cities worldwide. However, because terrorists are capable of adapt-
ing their strategy to subvert urban security measures, more uncertainty is induced in 
the populations (Ericson 2006).
From a city governance perspective, the rational nature of terrorism entails a 
challenge when making decisions about urban security. Although, in most cases, a 
perpetrator possesses far fewer resources than the city, the perpetrator only needs 
to find one vulnerability to exploit. In contrast, the city must attempt to cover all 
weaknesses in its security system. The consequence of this is that it is impossible 
to secure all potential targets. Moreover, because of the rational aspect of terrorism, 
counterterrorism measures are only effective when it comes to a few of the many 
possible threat manifestations. Vehicle mitigation measures, for example, do noth-
ing to protect against attacks by aircraft or suicide bombers wearing explosive belts 
(Dalgaard‐Nielsen 2017).
Furthermore, since terrorists are rational actors, it also means that, if one target 
in the city is secured, there is a risk of simply just moving the risk to another tar-
get. A well-known problem with reducing the risk of terrorism through target hard-
ening is that, when one target is protected, the risk-reducing effect only applies to 
that specific target (Cauley and Im 1988; Enders et  al. 1990; Landes 1978). This 
research has demonstrated the so-called substitution effect: the hardening of one 
target leads to increases in the numbers of attacks on other targets. For example, 
the installation of metal detectors in airports reduced skyjackings and diplomatic 
incidents but increased other kinds of hostage attacks (barricade missions, kidnap-
pings) and assassinations. In the long run, embassy fortification decreased barricade 
missions but increased assassinations (Enders and Sandier 1993). The substitution 
effect makes it hard to measure the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism meas-
ures. From a city planner’s perspective, the substitution effect means that, in harden-
ing one target, the risk is simply just moved from one object in the city to another.
Malicious intent
Security threats such as terrorism are defined by their deliberate, intentional malicious 
intent (Jore 2017). Terrorists deliberately use violence or threats of violence to obtain 
a political goal. The malicious intent of the nature of terrorism poses a challenge to 
assessing the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures not only because the 
perpetrator is strategic and can alter plans but because the malicious intent influences 
the reliability of data about urban terrorism security effectiveness. Even if we have 
access to data on incidents where counterterrorism measures have prevented a terrorist 
attack, it is hard to prove that the perpetrator actually had a malicious intent to cause 
harm. Such data will encompass the uncertainty of false positives: wrongly identify-
ing a source of harm and acting upon that source unnecessarily (Ericson 2006). An 
example of this is where a person is stopped at a security screening at the entrance of a 
public building. If this person is stopped with a weapon such as a knife, it is still hard 
to prove that he or she had the malicious intent to actually use the knife to carry out 
a terrorist attack. It might also be the case that this person was carrying the knife for 
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protective reasons. This means that, even though it is possible to collect data on when 
security measures such as screenings or arrests work, it is still hard to know that you 
have valid and reliable data of a perpetrator truly having malicious intent. This entails 
that the assessor of the effectiveness of security measures can easily draw conclusions 
based on false positives and find causalities that do not exist. Consequently, even if data 
on the effectiveness of terrorism exist, it is hard to prove intentionality.
Human complexity
“Defence in depth” has for centuries been an essential principle used in urban 
security. Defence in depth refers to a combination of security measures that both 
reduce the physical opportunities of a successful attack and increase the chances 
of an attacker being caught (Smith 2003). The idea behind this principle is that, if 
an object is made difficult to penetrate by hardening the target, the perpetrator will 
refrain from attacking this object because the possibility of achieving a success-
ful attack is reduced. Since many protective measures are implemented simultane-
ously, it is hard to measure the effectiveness of a single intervention. Even if there 
is a desired effect, it would still be unclear which measure or which combination of 
measures had brought about the desired effect. Also, it may well be that the ben-
eficial effects of one intervention are drowned out by the negative effects of others 
(Lindekilde 2012).
Furthermore, the models of defence in depth and target hardening have been criti-
cized by scholars, who claim that the rational choice perspective that lies behind 
these models is too narrow-minded and completely overlooks the complexity and 
unpredictability of human action (Van Dongen 2011). It is often claimed that terror-
ists will maximize the outcome of an attack. Regardless of this often-found claim, 
this statement does not have empirical support. There are multiple examples of ter-
rorist attacks, in which terrorists could easily have maximized the consequence but, 
for some reason, chose not to. An example of this is the Norwegian terrorist attack 
against the Government complex in Oslo in 2011, which was carried out at a time 
of the day when a small number of employees were present in the building complex. 
Moreover, terrorists are often conventional in target selection, choosing targets or 
sectors with a high level of security measures, such as the aviation industry. Very 
little is known about why some targets are picked over others and how perpetrators 
reason in this process. In addition, very little is known about how security measures 
influence the choice of target selection and in what way this is done (Van Dongen 
2011). Since little research exists on how terrorists reason when selecting targets, it 
is hard to evaluate whether urban security measures really are effective or not.
Ultimate goal of terrorism is political change
The ultimate goal of terrorism is not to destroy material values and infrastructure or 
to harm the city. Since these perpetrators have political change as their final goal, 
destroying buildings and critical infrastructure and causing loss of life are not the end 
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goal—these actions are rather the means. The vital goal of such perpetrators is to cre-
ate fear, in order to facilitate political change; consequently, it is abstract values that are 
under threat from such perpetrators. Examples of such values are trust, democracy and 
even the existence of society itself. This complicates the matter of assessing the effec-
tiveness of counterterrorism measures because it means that these measures should not 
infringe the values that they aim to protect. A further complication is that most security 
measures are directed at protecting material and economic assets, not symbolic values.
Urban security measures, such as surveillance or standoffs, are public goods, whose 
output is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, in the sense that all citizens benefit from 
them and there is no practical way to prevent anyone from deriving those benefits. 
However, security measures are not only a public good. They also have negative side 
effects. Often these negative side effects are presented in the dichotomy of “freedom 
versus security”, following Benjamin Franklin’s famous maxim that those wishing to 
trade freedom for temporary security deserve neither and shall lose both. However, it 
can be argued that these categories do not share such a dichotomous relationship. Pro-
tecting liberty does not automatically generate insecurity, nor does security necessitate 
a loss of rights. Moreover, this dichotomy can be seen as rather deterministic, as these 
strategies may not necessarily provide security (Fussey 2011, p. 86).
Most urban counterterrorism measures involve some form of troublesome trade-
offs that need to be taken into account when assessing the effectiveness of urban 
security measures. Gebbeken et al. (2012) argue that, since a free democratic soci-
ety will never accept a surveillance state, passive security measures such as innova-
tive and architecturally attractive buildings and landscape elements are the solution, 
to avoid fortification of the city. Such measures, however, also require troublesome 
trade-offs Meyer et al. 2015). They affect the physical landscape, including streets, 
squares, libraries, shopping malls and government buildings, and they entail values’ 
discrepancy regarding aesthetics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considera-
tions, safety, convenience, cost and social inclusion. To what extent these passive 
security measures benefit the aims of either openness or security is rarely evident.
Since security measures have negative side effects, these should also be taken into 
account when considering the effectiveness of urban countermeasures. Some urban 
security measures are controversial, and, in the end, the city might end up threaten-
ing the values it aims to protect. A further complication is that some research also 
suggests that interventions (e.g. military ones) could increase terrorism in the short 
run while, in the long run, having little significant effect on levels of terroristic vio-
lence; in some instances, such measures could increase the risk of terrorism (Fus-
sey 2011; Lum and Kennedy 2012; Van Dongen 2011). These temporal challenges 
necessitate that the effectiveness of counterterrorism and the associated negative 
side effects should also be investigated in a long-term horizon.
Discussions
City authorities nowadays face an extremely difficult challenge when it comes to 
protecting the city and its citizens from violent acts of terrorism. On the one hand, 
cities are peculiarly vulnerable to terrorism. They are highly accessible and include 
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a variety of possible targets. The buildings and infrastructure density, combined 
with crowds of people, offer a wide range of potential attack scenarios. Additionally, 
gatherings of people not only entail the opportunity for mass-scale attacks but also 
the prospect of instant communication of the terrorists’ message to a broad audience 
by citizens’ use of social media. Subsequently, citizens often expect city authorities 
to respond to the threat of terrorism with a variety of urban counterterrorism meas-
ures, to deter future terrorists’ possible targets of opportunity and to ensure that the 
public is safe and secure. On the other hand, multiple ontological and epistemologi-
cal knowledge limitations, regarding the threat of urban terrorism and how counter-
terrorism actually affects this threat, mean that city authorities should refrain from 
just uncritically implementing urban countermeasures. The nine challenges outlined 
and discussed in this paper are predominantly related to the lack of relevant data and 
the difficulties of establishing causality in order to assess the effectiveness of urban 
counterterrorism measures. However, the last challenge outlined in this article might 
be the one that is most problematic: urban counterterrorism measures involve nega-
tive side effects that threaten values that should not be jeopardized without having 
any tools to measure effectiveness. Swanstrom (2002, p. 135) argues that ‘The main 
threat to cities comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terror-
ism that undermine the freedom of thought and movement that are the lifeblood of 
cities’. Thus, regardless of ontological and epistemological limitations to the meas-
urement of the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures, there is clearly 
still a need to carry out such evaluations. In modern democracies, authorities at all 
levels are expected to be accountable for their use of public resources. The lack of 
a balance between the implementation and assessment of effectiveness can reflect 
negatively on them (Lum and Kennedy 2012). Thus, how a municipality or a city 
chooses to prevent urban terrorism matters not only to security outcomes but also 
to how citizens view the legitimacy of state actions. Thus, the current decision to 
descale security, so municipalities must spend large amounts of funds to urban secu-
rity governance, must be coupled with the responsibility of gauging whether meas-
ures are effective, ineffective, or harmful.
Although the aforementioned ontological and epistemological limitations in 
measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures are challenging, attempts 
should be made to achieve knowledge on what is effective and “evidence-based” 
urban counterterrorism. The term “evidence-based” as a descriptor for decision-
making means that choices to implement interventions, like those that attempt to 
counter terrorism, are based on scientific and analytical knowledge that rigorously 
examines their impact and outcomes (Lum and Kennedy 2012, p. 4). This should 
also be the norm for urban security measures. The problem with evaluating the 
effectiveness of security measures discussed in this article is not that the measure-
ment of the effectiveness of urban security measures is impossible because of the 
ontological and epistemological aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism. These 
should rather be seen as knowledge constraints that need to be taken into account 
when considering the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures. Given these 
knowledge constraints, it is important that those who carry out the evaluation of 
effectiveness aim to establish a diverse group of evaluators, so that diverse opinions 
and perspectives can lay the foundation for optimal decision-making and evaluation.
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In reality, multiple actors at the municipality and city level struggle to make deci-
sions on what measures to implement or not and how to prioritize and select between 
urban security measures that can also have negative side effects. It might never be pos-
sible to fully objectively measure the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures. 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian authorities and other local actors are obliged by the new 
National Security Law (2018) to perform assessments about the effectiveness of such 
measures. A few scholars have tried to construct evaluation frameworks for terror-
ism and radicalization policy and associated countermeasures (Langdalen et al. 2018; 
Lindekilde 2012; Lum and Kennedy 2012; Meyer et al. 2015; Noordegraaf et al. 2017; 
Van Dongen 2011). At present, these frameworks are not adapted to be utilized in the 
context of urban security. However, there are undoubtedly concepts, theories and meth-
ods that are transferable, if they are adjusted to an urban security context. This is a topic 
that further research should address.
Conclusions
Given that the threat of terrorism is a phenomenon imbued with ambiguity, uncertainty, 
secrecy and human complexity, in which strategic, calculating—yet unpredictable—
human beings are the ones that pose the threat, there will always be knowledge limita-
tions associated with the threat of terrorism and the ability to measure the effective-
ness of urban counterterrorism measures. Urban terrorism transcends the distinctions 
between cause and effect, local and global problems, fact and impression, dependent on 
numerous factors, making a comprehensive assessment of effectiveness a challenging 
task. However, new laws have been proposed that claim that security measures should 
have security gains and be cost-effective. Furthermore, the public deserves an answer 
to the essential question: Are counterterrorism measures legitimate and effective? 
Thus, despite the ontological and epistemological challenges associated with measur-
ing the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures, there is still a need to do so. 
The ontological and epistemological challenges of evaluating the effectiveness of secu-
rity measures do not entail that the measurement of the effectiveness of urban security 
measures is impossible. The ontological and epistemological challenges should rather 
be seen as knowledge constraints that need to be taken into account when considering 
the effectiveness of urban counterterrorism measures. Given that urban counterterror-
ism measures influence the urban environment and often infringe civil liberties, such 
measures should not just be uncritically embraced without having any tools to measure 
their effectiveness. Without knowledge on what constitutes the effectiveness of urban 
security measures, the city might end up infringing the same values that it aims to pro-
tect, without achieving security.
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